The present paper demonstrates that within the software industry high performance organizations emerge when software companies exploit the equivocality of the information technology as well as their interpretive capabilities in order to recycle software.
The point of departure for the paper is the observation that for many years reuse of software objects, etc. has attracted much interest and energy from researchers, engineers and managers within the software industry. Foremost, because they perceive such reuse as the key to high performance in software development. Ultimately, this idea focus on creation of software factories which will improve efficiency in software development and provide managers with more control over the software development process. However, truly successful implementation of the idea has never happened, most likely because its champions solely emphasize technical aspects of the process.
We already know that the equivocality of the information technology implies that it can take on many different forms and holds an infinite number of possible and plausible applications. Besides, based on a longitudinal study of software development and new business creation in a rapidly growing software company this paper shows that rather than focusing on reuse of software objects, software companies must give attention to the possibilities for recycling of software provided by the equivocality of the information technology, if they want to improve performance. Yet, recycling of software is not an easy task, as besides being a matter of mastering technological knowledge, it demands that software companies undertake continuous sensemaking of the software, and thereby, convince their customers about its usefulness as solutions to their specific needs. When successful then this process implies that over time software platforms are used for provision of solutions to a variety of needs. To illustrate this idea the paper traces two software platforms on tour, and it analyzes the formulation of new interpretations which facilitate their recycling.
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Introduction
Software production, apart from mass production, i.e., replication which is a simple electronic process, differs from production of for example cars and computers. Besides, software development differs from other disciplines within the IT industry, e.g., design of chips, as it takes place at a remarkably slower speed and has not experienced noticeable increase in productivity, and thereby, attained economy of scale [1, 2] . Today after more than 40 years as an engineering discipline software development is still more like a craft or art than like a technology suited to the precise descriptions and predictability of traditional scientific, engineering, or manufacturing disciplines [1] . Especially, software development appears to have characteristics that make conventional engineering or factory operations difficult to introduce -little product or process standardization, wide variations in project contents and work flows, cumbersome tasks difficult and often counterproductive to divide, de-skill, or automate. Consequently, software development pertains to plague researchers, engineers and managers, like it has done since the beginning of the computer era, e.g., it may take years to develop even small applications [3] .
In order to cope with these problems some Japanese software firms attempted to implement the software factory concept in order to assure that at least some software could be produced in a manner more akin to engineering and manufacturing than to craft practices. However, it is important not to overestimate the extent and nature of reuse in Japanese firms. Like their counterparts elsewhere in the world they mainly confined the recycling of components to similar product families [1] . Hence, it appears that establishment of software repositories and introduction of object oriented programming are common strategies for software companies attempting to reuse software [4, 5] . Also, during the early 1980s some software companies started development of so-called CASE tools aimed at structuralization of the development process, and in order to cope with the difficulties in disciplining software development. These tools facilitate complex design and testing operations, reduction in time spend on relatively routine tasks such as coding or documentation, help to locate software components for reuse, and ease of project-data collection and analysis as well as control over budgets and schedules. However, a recent study of software reuse [6] showed that neither CASE tools nor software repositories promote reuse of software (see also [7] ). In addition, Orlikowski [8, 9] demonstrated that attempts by software companies to standardize the software development process through implementation of CASE tools change the division of labour in software development teams. In turn, such changes in the social structure results in polarization among software developers, which is evidenced in acts of coercion and rebellion, and therefore, software companies experience problems in harvesting the predicted improvements in productivity.
If we look at new business creation then it appears to have much in common with software development, as it is a highly uncertain and time-and investment-intensive process. Furthermore, it is a process marked by setbacks and unpleasant surprises, and without guarantee for success, and thus, it poses a unique set of challenges for managers. Especially, this is true within the IT industry where the companies confront turbulent and changing environments, as organizations and people constantly define and discover new areas of application for the technology. However, literature on new business creation in software companies seems non-existing, although many researchers have studied innovation in various types of high tech companies [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] .
The empirical outset for the present paper is a study of software development and new business creation in a software company. This study revealed that the company was able to increase performance through quick start up of new business creation. Further investigation showed that the company recycled software platforms, and that such recycling was facilitated by formation of new interpretations of the software platforms, which enabled the company to use them as solutions to a variety of needs.
As its basis for analysis of these processes the paper adopts a social constructivist view of the technology. Researchers working with this perspective [17, 18, 19] claim that the information technology is equivocal, i.e., that it can take on different forms and holds an infinite number of possible applications, and thus, needs ongoing sense making to be managed. Yet, Barley [17] and Weick [19] take on a reactive approach to the information technology, as they analyze how organizations and people in them interpret and react to new IT-applications introduced to them. In contrast, this paper adopts a proactive approach, as it examines how a software company produces interpretations of its software platforms, in order to further sale of them to its potential customers. Thereby, the paper investigates what it takes for software companies to recycle software.
Empirical settings for the study
The empirical setting for this study is the rapidly growing Danish software company Unique Ltd. Unique's occupations are consultancy services and design, development and implementation of advanced and tailored software products for industrial, scientific and administrative purposes. Hence, the products offered by Unique are not products according to the conventional understanding of this term, instead, Unique delivers turnkey systems.
In 1990, the year before the study began Unique employed about 350 people and realized a revenue at about 35 million US $, whereas in 1993 when the study ended the company realized a revenue at about 83 million US $ and had more than 600 employees.
Two cases on recycling of software
The present paragraph includes two cases on recycling of software. In both cases development of software platforms began around 1985. Some years later attempts to commercialize the platforms began. In one case these attempts were successful whereas in the other commercialization never happened. Anyway in both cases search for new uses of the platforms began and resulted in recycling of software.
The basis for write up of the cases are empirical evidences generated in semistructured qualitative interviews and informal talks with employees in Unique. Some interviews were taped and transcribed, whereas others were documented as short hand notes. Besides, documentary material were collected. Collection of empirical evidence took place over a period of three years starting in January 1991.
Case 1: From hospital information systems to aircraft maintenance systems
In 1985 Unique initiated a project aimed at development of a workstation-based prototype for electronic handling of patient records at hospitals, as managers in Unique perceived it as a potential application of workstations which at this point in time became more common. The project continued in 1986 with development of the MEDICOM platform. In 1987 Unique and the US company Performance Criterion Inc. formed a new company Image Concept Inc. (ICI) and Unique transferred the ownership of MEDICOM to ICI. The objective of ICI was distribution and f urther development of MEDICOM, and ICI succeeded in selling MEDICOM to three hospitals in Nebraska, USA. MEDICOM supported the work flow at the hospitals with distributed capturing of medical records in image form and administration of these from an optical disk archive storage. The main functionalities in MEDICOM were; electronic picture storage based on optical discs, document scanning and storing, case handling, accounting facilities and electronic mailbox. Also, it contained facilities for drafting reports for peer reviews and health insurance company reports. Although, ICI owned MEDICOM then also Unique tried to sell the system to hospitals in Europe, but without success. However, a quite different use of MEDICOM soon appeared. From its formation in 1978 Unique maintained business relations with the German airline Lufthansa, as Unique delivered consultancy services to Lufthansa's EDP department. In the late months of 1987 the management of Lufthansa's EDP department announced that it would visit Unique's headquarters in Denmark, as it wanted to know more about Unique's activities. Managers in Unique saw this as an opportunity to show Lufthansa a number of solution concepts, which might be useful to the airline. For this purpose they selected MEDICOM as one of its showcases. After the demonstration the visitors from Lufthansa expressed interest in MEDICOM as they intuitively felt that it could serve as the technological basis for an aircraft maintenance system. Especially, they liked its man-machine interface, and therefore, they asked Unique to forward a proposal for a prototype of an aircraft maintenance system based on MEDICOM. In February 1988 Unique submitted such a proposal to Lufthansa, naming the proposed prototype GATE (Graphics and Text Environment), i.e., a system for a computer aided handling of documentation for technical services for aircraft maintenance. Having reviewed the proposal for the prototype Lufthansa expressed satisfaction and interest in a full system. Accordingly, in March 1988 Unique, on Lufthansa's demand, submitted a proposal for the GATE system to the airline. This proposal described the features of a full-scale GATE system as:
• Removal of the need for maintenance engineers to handle bulky maintenance manuals.
• Electronic storage of maintenance manual and maintenance schedule data from manufacturer's information received in digital or printed form.
• Local printing of maintenance documentation in the form of maintenance job cards or as actual document pages.
• Automation of planning procedures.
• Interactive facilities at the maintenance work station for browsing, editing, annotating, and adding maintenance information.
Lufthansa accepted the proposal and thereafter Unique initiated development of GATE. The final delivery of the complete GATE system took place in November 1988. The kernel in the GATE system was the MEDICOM platform, and it used a man-machine interface adapted to aircraft maintenance planning. The GATE system stored the full maintenance manual of aircraft like Boeing 747 and Airbus 320 and assisted the maintenance controller in drafting job cards for the engineers.
The successful delivery of the GATE system to Lufthansa resulted in the establishment of the Transportation Services Division in Unique, which included activities focusing on delivery of systems and consultancy services to airlines. Putting emphasis on this market Unique succeeded in selling adapted versions of the GATE system to Iberia, Singapore Airlines, and Boeing. Especially, the sale to the Boeing aircraft manufacturing company in Seattle was important because it made Unique subcontractor to the Boeing 777 aircraft as the GATE system will be delivered with each new aircraft as the standard aircraft maintenance system.
While completing the delivery to Boeing the name of the system was changed to Life CDM (Compound Document Management), and today more than 10 years after its conception search for new uses of MEDICOM continues within the drug industry and the automobile industry.
Case 2: From artificial intelligence to space information systems
From 1984 until 1989 Unique invested resources in development of artificial intelligence systems for various purposes, e.g., credit evaluation, medical diagnosis, information search/access, etc. Two divisions (Corporate Technology Division and AI Division) in Unique focused on development of intelligent interfaces enabling non-technical users to access and retrieve data from various types of databases. These activities took place in R&D projects sponsored by the Commission of European Countries and resulted in prototypes of such systems. Yet, commercialization of the prototypes never happened as neither of the two divisions sold a system based on the prototypes. However, Unique's development of the prototypes was not fruitless, as the company's sales engineers included descriptions of them in proposals for commercial projects, in order to demonstrate that Unique mastered technologies for accessing and retrieving information from various types of databases. However, Unique never used these technologies in the resulting projects.
In October 1990 ESRIN, the information services division of the European Space Agency (ESA), made public an Invitation to Tender (ITT) for a project aimed at development of an Intelligent Intermediary System (IIS), i.e., a system which provides its users with homogeneous access to technologically heterogeneous and geographically dispersed databases. Among the receivers of the ITT were the Space Division in Unique. In advance, the Space Division had several times submitted proposals to ESRIN, but never obtained a contract with ESRIN. The managers in the Space Division experienced that the reason for their lack of success with proposals to ESRIN was that they did not understand the essence of ESRIN's ITTs, as they did not hold enough contacts to ESRIN to obtain information needed to understand exactly what ESRIN's needs were. Consequently, they could not tailor their proposals to ESRIN's needs, and thus, ESRIN did not appreciate their proposals.
Having read ESRIN's ITT the managers in the Space Division judged that probably Unique could get the contract for the IIS project, because from several years of collaboration at an ESA centre in Holland they knew managers in the Italian company ItaSoft very well. ItaSoft was well-known to ESRIN, and therefore, the managers in the Space Division now had better access to information about ESRIN's needs. In addition, the managers in the Space Division knew that employees in the Corporate Technology Division and the AI Division mastered technological knowledge, which would empower Unique to formulate a proposal suited for ESRIN's needs. Therefore, the managers in the Space Division decided to submit a proposal.
Having decided to submit a proposal to ESRIN, they initiated cooperation with ItaSoft and the two companies formed a group of people holding various types of expertise needed to compose a proposal for the IIS project. The group's main task was to produce a proposal fulfilling ESRIN's requirements and needs. Thereby, proving to ESRIN that Unique and ItaSoft held the expertise needed to accomplish the IIS-project, and thereby, qualifying the two companies as suppliers of the IIS to ESRIN. Ergo, the group had to translate the prototypes developed in the Corporate Technology Division and the AI Division into the context of the space industry. That is, the group had to compose a proposal mixing the ingredients (project management qualifications, quality assurance, project plans, etc.) commonly included in proposals to ESRIN and a description of the IIS to be developed employing the expertise mastered by employees in Unique and ItaSoft. Observing a tight dead-line, November 1990, the group completed the proposal.
ESRIN's evaluation of the proposal was very positive, as Unique and ItaSoft offered a more modern and advanced system than those proposed by other consortia. Hence, Unique and ItaSoft obtained the contract for the IIS project.
After obtaining the contract for the IIS project the managers in the Space Division and the CEO in Unique expressed that the project represented a long-term investment in build up of a business relationship to a new type of customer. One of the managers in the Space Division underscored the strategic importance of the project: "IIS is a strategic project where many things grow into a whole. Unique holds useful prototypes and technological expertise, we face customers who are interested in similar systems, and who seem interested in doing business with Unique." Ergo, managers in Unique believed that the system to be implemented for ESRIN represented a promising new business area as many other potential customers would be interested in similar systems. Also, they expected that success in the IIS project would open up opportunities for establishment of long-term business relations with ESRIN. Both these evolutions would enable Unique to build up a new business unit aimed at delivery systems based on the platforms developed in the IIS-project.
Analyzing recycling of software
From both cases it appears that Unique recycled software. Yet, the cases do not tell us about the processes that facilitate recycling of software. Hence, this main paragraph explains what it takes for a software company to increase performance by speeding up new business creation through recycling of software.
This explanation is threefold. First, it demonstrates the significance of interpretations, i.e., why software companies must provide potential customers with interpretations of its software platforms. Second, it focus on the interpretative processes required to recycle software. Finally, it explains how presentations of convincing interpretations happen in proposals.
The significance of interpretations
The outset for this part of the explanation is Weick's [19] and Barley's [17] point that the information technology is equivocal, admits several plausible interpretations, can take on many visages, and thus, requires ongoing sensemaking to be managed. Hence, to persuade potential customers to buy their products software companies must provide potential customers with interpretations of the software, which they believe make sense to them as solutions to their needs. As an illustration of the importance of interpretations of the information technology Yakura [20] provides the following example:
"…a writer might think of a computer as a big calculator, helpful only for numerical computations, and completely useless to his or her existence. If a consultant could alter the meaning of the computer for the writer, introducing it as a more efficient kind of typewriter, the consultant might then be able to sell it to the writer as a word processing system."
From the cases it also appears that interpretations of the software are the secret weapons of software companies as they use them to explain software platforms to potential customers, e.g., in the first case the new interpretation of MEDICOM as an aircraft maintenance system made it quite interesting for Lufthansa, whereas the interpretation of MEDICOM as a Hospital Information System made it almost useless. Hence, the issue is not whether interpretations are wrong or right, as there is no such thing as true or false interpretations, but whether they speak to potential customers and produce reality, in terms of meanings shared by the software company and its potential customers [21] .
Interpretative processes required to recycle software
The objective of the interpretive processes is to produce interpretations of the software platforms, which balance the potential customers' needs and the technological possibilities in specifications of the products to be delivered by the software company. However, the interpretative processes required to recycle software are not straight forward, they require two types of interpretive capabilities. First, to develop of interpretations meaningful to potential customers sales engineers must interpret signals from potential customers to understand what is possible and be able to communicate effectively with potential customers, i.e., they must understand potential customers' languages and conceptual frameworks [22] . Also, sales engineers must be sensitive to the preferences, needs, beliefs, attitudes, norms, and aspirations of potential customers.
About this the sales engineer who completed Unique's sale of the GATE system to Boeing noted: "Clearly you must know their (the potential customers) story and their problems, and you cannot do any sale unless you understand and speak their language, and understand what their problems are."
In both cases we saw that it was important that Unique had information about the potential customers' needs. For example, in the second case access to such information through the Italian partner was required to fully understand ESRIN's needs.
Second, sales engineers must interpret the software in meaningful ways to potential customers, as the software has no value until interpretations explain and make sense of it. These interpretations are important as sales engineers must make potential customers understand what Unique can do for them and have something to swop with, in terms of interpretations valuable to potential customers. Again the sales engineer cited above described this essential feature of the process:
"In Unique we possess a lot of platforms and we develop concepts of how to exploit them. Hence, the job of the salesman is to initiate fantasies for the potential customer, who might say: 'Hey, this is exactly what we need', or 'It seems that your company can help us solve this problem'."
Without interpretations and fantasies negotiations about sale of products are at best made difficult, since they must be prospective from the point of view of both the selling and the buying organization [23] . Also, it is important that the software company keeps its interpretation of the software platforms in shape with the changing demands of its potential customers, as potential customers become bored when they observe that the software company constantly presents the same interpretations to them.
Presentations of interpretations in proposals
In both cases Unique presented its interpretations of the software platforms to potential customers in proposals in order to attract their attention and sell products to them. To do so the proposals had to do two things in order to offer the software company a right to be heard.
First, they had to create interesssement, i.e., make the interpretations attractive to the potential customers and influence them to show interest in the interpretations. (Interessement refers to the action of enrolling and it involves attracting one entity by coming between that entity and a third [24] ). Thereby, attracting the potential customers to specific products, which Unique assumed they were interested in buying, because if not then the potential customers had rejected the proposal as useless.
Second, to prepare the road for a sale the proposals had to lay-out the translation of the software platform into a specific product and demonstrate that it was possible to implement the proposed product. Ergo, the objective of the translation was to enrol the potential customers, keep up their interest in the proposed products and persuade them to buy them.
The process of designing a proposal is a task very much alike the process of designing a scientific text, and software companies employ methods similar to those used by scientists to create a forceful textual structure that will carry weight when those who wrote it are not physically present to argue their case [25] .
When designing a proposal the software company must do two things in order to facilitate formation of a suitable proposal. First, the software company must select the potential customer at whom to aim the proposal. This selection of a receiver is crucial, as otherwise the software company cannot create a proposal that makes sense to the potential customer. Second, the software company must identify how to construct the proposal in order to enrol the potential customer. The two tasks are interrelated because what count as 'appropriate' words are a function of the characteristics of the potential customer. Hence, a proposal that operates upon one potential customer will leave another quite unmoved.
When translating a software platform into a specific product that presumably matches the potential customer's needs the software company tries to demonstrate a close connection between the software platform and the product. Thereby, enabling the potential customer to go from the equivocal software platform to the specific product. Because, if the proposal fails to do so then the software company will face difficulties in convincing the potential customer about the superiority of its product. Thus, to present a trustworthy translation of a software platform into a specific product the proposal divides the translation into series of layers assumed to make it possible for the potential customer to jump from one to another. Each layer is a translation of the last one as it comments on the layer above. Hence, each little translation must be done carefully to, prevent the potential customer from pricking holes therein and not loosing him when translating from one layer to another. Thus, none of the layers can be missing because if they are not present then the chain of translations collapses.
Metaphoric it makes sense to view the layers as filters in a funnel, which narrows down the general software platform to a specific product. Hence, it is possible to talk about the process of conceptualizing products as funnelling of software through a number of steps each giving meaning to it. At the mouth the funnel is wide, but then it concentrates the software platform to focus on a specific use. Besides the layers an equally important element in the translation of the software platform into a specific use is the utilization of forces borrowed and enrolled by the software company. Mainly, software companies utilize forces of two components; technological knowledge and domain knowledge. Each component contributes to the proposals in different ways and their forces derives from diverge sources:
• The forces of technological knowledge derive from the software companies' capabilities to frame and form the software. Hence, technological knowledge enables the software company to demonstrate to potential customers how it from the general software platform can produce products that fit the potential customers' needs.
• The forces of domain knowledge originate from the software company's ability to understand the domain of the potential customer's business. For the purpose of demonstrating understanding of the potential customer's business the software company chooses arguments and 'pictures' familiar to the potential customer. In turn, demonstration of familiarity with potential customers' business makes it easier for the software company to sell its products to them.
If we revisit the second case then it appears that Unique and ItaSoft's capability to conceptualize the proposal for a system matching the ITT from ESRIN, depended on; technological knowledge obtained by employees through participation in prior projects, and domain knowledge, i.e., knowledge about ESRIN's needs, held by employees in ItaSoft.
When constructing a proposal the software company seeks to assemble the forces of the components in powerful combinations. Thereby, bringing them into play in a way it believes make sense to the potential customer. Hence, proposals present themselves as actor-models, which operate upon potential customers and translate them to particular places in that world. I.e., proposals seek to enrol potential customers by means of appropriate arrays of borrowed and enrolled forces. Yet, proposals never operate in a vacuum, as they are only strong if they have force at the point where they are received and if their forces are recognized as having been properly borrowed and juxtaposed. Thus, usually a proposal must pass many tests set-up by the potential customer before it is accepted by the potential customer. Yet, if it passes all the tests then negotiation about delivery of a product can begin.
Conclusion and implications
The present paper showed that high performance in software companies may very well result from recycling of software. If software companies recycle software then they can reduce the time, and thereby, the financial resources needed to both produce new products and start up new business creation, because when recycling software platforms then software companies do not have to start from scratch in the production process. Consequently, the paper captured aspects of high performance in software companies not described in existing research.
Especially, the paper demonstrated that the equivocality of the information technology allows software companies to recycle software. In the case of Unique this implied that the company could revitalize seemingly burnt-out technologies. For example, the proposals forwarded to Lufthansa and ESRIN clearly represented recycling of software developed years before. Hence, it appears that recycling of software platforms implies that over time they are dressed in new costumes, when old ones are not useful anymore. The aim of the costumes is to attract potential customers and initiate negotiations, which hopefully lead to sale of products.
In addition, the paper showed that software companies' ability to recycle software successfully hinges on their capability to produce and present interpretations of the software in ways that strike into the hearts of potential customers. Hence, the paper suggests that if software companies want to increase their performance through speed up of new business creation then they must develop and exploit their interpretive capabilities to form new ideas for application of their software.
